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Abstract 
While the traditional model of consent is supported by codes and theories of ethics, 
is enshrined in law, and provides the core  of health policy and clinical governance, 
it is unclear how accurately it reflects clinical practice and in particular how 
accurately it accounts  for edition-making in ‘high-risk’ situations where patients 
are critically ill and facing death.  
 
Main text 
In Western liberal democracies, the requirement for a patient’s informed consent 
prior to medical treatment is indisputable. The importance attached to consent 
reflects the cultural and philosophical privileging of autonomy, liberty, and human 
rights and the broad commitment to the recognition and maintenance of human 
dignity.  
For a patient’s consent to be legally and ethically valid, it is generally assumed that 
a number of ‘criteria’ or ‘elements’ need to be satisfied, namely that the patient has 
the capacity to consent, has made the decision voluntarily, and has been provided 
with ‘material’ information about the proposed treatment, including its rationale, 
costs, risks and benefits. While differences remain between patient-centred and 
doctor-centred approaches to standards of information provision, it is clear that all 
common law countries demand that patients be told of the risks of having, or not 
having, treatment. 
But while this traditional model of consent is supported by codes and theories of 
ethics, is enshrined in health law, and provides the core of health policy and 
clinical governance, it is unclear how accurately it reflects clinical practice, and in 
particular, how accurately it accounts for decision–making in ‘high-risk’ situations 
where patients are critically ill and facing death.  
 There are three principal reasons why we may feel uncomfortable about the 
alignment between ethics, law and clinical practice in regards to consent in high-
risk settings. The first is that the way in which consent in constructed in law and 
ethics implies a sense of detachment that is simply impossible, particularly when 
patients are under the threat of incipient mortality. The second is that ‘risk’ is 
extraordinarily complex and may be understood both ‘objectively’ (as a 
probabilistic assessment of adverse outcomes) and ‘subjectively’, and also by 
reference to both the patient (as a function of their diagnosis and/or comorbidity – 
that is to say, a high-risk or low-risk patient) and the intervention (as a function of 
its necessity, efficacy, burdensomeness and complexity, and the uncertainty of its 
consequences). The third reason is that there is very limited empirical data 
regarding how consent is actualised in high-risk situations. In part, this is because 
such studies are enormously difficult to conduct because time is frequently of the 
essence and patients/participants are highly vulnerable and (perhaps ironically) 
because obtaining consent to participate in research of this kind is so ethically 
fraught. Consequently, the data that does exist often focuses on endpoints of 
questionable relevance, such as the documentation of consent, is derived from 
methodologies of dubious veracity such as retrospective interviews with 
‘survivors’, and is drawn from highly selected patient populations most notably 
from patients undergoing major surgery, and so may have limited relevance to 
other ‘high-risk’ medical situations where therapeutic options are more limited and 
the clinical urgency more ‘pressing’.1  
While it is tempting to suggest that the lack of clarity we feel about the application 
of consent in high-risk situations is simply a methodological problem, we suggest 
that high-risk situations reveal more fundamental problems with the way that 
consent has been conceptualized and the notion of autonomy that it presumes. 
More specifically, we suggest that attachment both to the notion of consent as 
‘atomistic’ and to the idea that autonomy is best understood as an individual’s 
freedom to choose or to rationally and intentionally articulate one’s preferences 
and moral positions, is misplaced and misguided.2,3  
While philosophical accounts of autonomy have traditionally focused on 
sovereignty and rationality, when faced with death patients are intensely vulnerable 
and they may become more concerned with their care and their future than their 
‘power’ or independence. Patients, in particular those facing a high risk of death, 
 are often highly cognizant of both the degree to which they are reliant upon the 
expertise of the healthcare professionals and institutions upon which their survival 
depends, and of the ways in which their choices are determined by, and impact 
upon, their families and friends.4 This account of decision-making in high-risk 
situations is more consistent with feminist accounts of autonomy, which note the 
degree to which autonomy is ‘relational’ – located socially and not simply within 
the individual.5  
While relational autonomy does not ‘dull’ the immediacy or the starkness of the 
choices faced by patients in high–risk situations, locating autonomy socially, rather 
than individually, and describing it in terms of the specific medical context in 
which it is actualized, better accounts for the ways in which every element of 
consent is compromised or challenged by illness. 
For patients are rarely, if ever, ‘free’ to make decisions about their healthcare in 
the sense that their decisions are independent from the impact of their condition 
and the concerns of others.  
Patients often have compromised decision-making capacity, and may lack the 
information or understanding to fully comprehend the situation in which they find 
themselves. This may, of course, be a function of physical and mental debility, 
medications, pain, depression and anxiety but it may also be an inevitable 
consequence of illness and the limited options that patients have when faced with a 
threat to their life.6 Indeed, in many ways the greatest influences on decision-
making, autonomy and agency may be disease itself, the existential threat of 
extinction and the social and moral worlds in which patients live.7 Consequently, in 
high-risk situations patients may not need more information about choices that they 
do not have, or even more detail about the interventions that represent their only 
therapeutic option other than palliation (which should be provided in any case). For 
in these situations, the notion of an ‘informed’ consent becomes a misnomer, as 
when the risk of death becomes closer to certainty, the materiality of the risks of 
treatment disappears. What is therefore needed is some shared understanding of the 
goals of treatment, the outcomes that are hoped for and the rationale for the choices 
being made, and a promise of care and ‘persistence’. In other words, a promise that 
the treating team will support the patient as they struggle to survive and, if this is 
not possible, as they die. 
 None of this denies the importance of respect for autonomy and of identifying and 
addressing the many ways in which healthcare institutions and healthcare 
professionals accentuate inequity and disability and diminish dignity and 
autonomy.8 Neither does it remove the obligation upon healthcare professionals to 
maximize patient’s agency and autonomy and provide them with the information 
they need to realize their treatment preferences consistent with their own values, 
needs and goals.  
Instead, recognizing the medical and social context in which high-risk medical 
decisions are made reminds us that consent is far more limited and far more 
constrained that we may imagine it to be (at least in ethical and legal terms). It also 
illustrates the degree to which medicine is, as Ed Pellegrino has noted,9  frequently 
characterized by “a peculiar constellation of urgency, intimacy, unavoidability, 
unpredictably, and extraordinary vulnerability”.  These insights, in turn, illustrate 
the manner in which medicine, law and ethics inform each other and the 
inadequacy of simply ‘applying’ abstracted ethical and legal constructs to the 
experience of illness and healthcare delivery.  
 
The structural elements of informed consent perform important legal, ethical, 
institutional and educational functions. But when properly understood they are all, 
almost of necessity, complex, ill-defined, socially constructed and a matter of 
judgment. And, all, like every aspect of healthcare, rest upon foundations of care, 
trust and a realisation of the fragility of the human condition. 
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